

INDONESIA'S STRATEGIES FOR EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) SOVEREIGNTY WITH 1982 UNCLOS PROVISIONS: NORTH NATUNA SEA

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Abstract: North Natuna Sea's abundance of natural resources provides a tremendous pull for diverse parties, who, for the sake of profit maximization, are willing to commit any crime. A further report found that the claims of South East Asean countries and China on Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters in North Natuna Sea are completely divorced from the attractiveness of the natural resources. Considering the strategies to resolve any differences and the disputes between South East Asean countries and China in a peaceful manner through dialogue, affirming commitment to the goals and principles of UNCLOS, 1982, this paper provides a systematic review of the strategies as a the treaty of amity and cooperation in the South East Asian model for Indonesia's stability which promotes agency and reflective practice. Comparing the current practice of the current waters' cases in North Natuna Sea to the international stabilities reported in the literature, this review suggests that North Natuna Sea needs adopt two strategies that are concurrently executed and mutually supportive. The first is a diplomatic strategy consisting of two simultaneous steps, the first of which involves efforts to expedite the implementation of negotiations and the conclusion of a territorial boundary agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. sea. The second strategy is a defense diplomacy approach to China, by leveraging Indonesia-China bilateral defense cooperation and multilateral defense cooperation venues such as ARF and ADMM Plus where China is a discussion partner.

Key words: *Indonesia, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Sovereignty, 1982 UNCLOS Provisions, North Natuna Sea*

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1. INTRODUCTION

A few days after the 1st of December 2021, both the Indonesian and international press reported that China had been asked to stop drilling for oil and natural gas in the North Natuna Sea by China (Kumparan, 2020). The request came from China. China claims that the drilling location is located within its borders, and because Indonesia has allowed it to continue, China believes that Indonesia must also put a stop to it (Octavian, 2022). Since the location of the oil and natural gas drilling on the Tuna Block, which is approximately 140 nautical miles from Natuna Island, falls inside Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Indonesia has chosen to ignore China's protests and continue drilling despite the fact that China has expressed concern about the situation. Since the end of June 2021, China has been vocal in its opposition to Indonesia's plans to drill for oil and natural gas in the North Natuna Sea. According to a report by Sebastian Strangio; "The standoff in question began in late June, when a semi-

submersible rig, the Noble Clyde Boudreaux, arrived and began drilling two appraisal wells in Indonesia's Tuna Block, located approximately 140 nautical miles of the North Natuna Sea." (Strangio, 2021). Brunei Darussalam has also claimed a number of seas in the North Natuna Sea region.

Brunei declared Louisa Reef, which is located on Brunei's continental shelf and is a part of the Spratly Islands, to be a part of its territory when it gained its independence from Britain in 1984. Louisa Reef is part of the Spratly Islands. Brunei only asserts ownership over Louisa Reef, despite the fact that the marine features Bombay Castle, Owen Shoal, and Rifleman Bank are all located in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Brunei. Louisa Reef is also contested territory for Vietnam. Since the 17th century, Vietnam has maintained that it is the rightful owner of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the country maintains that it possesses historical documents to back up its claim. Vietnam controls 25 rock and sand formations and islands in the Spratly Islands,

including: Spratly Island, Namyit Island, Sin Cowe Island, Amboyna Island, Sand Cay, West Reef, Central Reef, East Reef, Bombay Castle, Barque Canada Reef, Pearson Reef, Alison Reef, Cornwallis South Reef, Tennent Reef, Lansdowne Reef, Collins Reef, Sin Cowe Island, Union Reefs, Discovery Great Reef, Petley Reef, Petley Reef, In this instance, it appeared that the Philippines did not want to be left behind in recognizing the territorial seas of the North Natuna Sea.

Scarborough Shoal is a circular coral reef formation located 230 kilometers from the Philippines and 1,000 kilometers from China's Hainan Island. The Philippines asserts sovereignty over the northeastern portion of the Spratly Islands, which is known as Kalayaan in the Philippines. This portion of the Spratly Islands contains the Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines have jurisdiction over Thifu Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, Loalita Cay, Lankiam Cay, Flat Island, Nanshan Island, Second Thomas Shoal, and Commodore Reef. In this instance, Malaysia followed the Philippines in

making nearly identical claims, but in different locations, particularly adjacent territories.

Malaysia has staked a claim to a portion of the South Seas in northern Borneo. This area has at least 12 maritime structures in the Spratly Islands, two of which are in the jurisdiction of the Vietnamese: Amboyna Cay and Barque Canada Reef. Although Malaysia asserts ownership of Commodore Reef and Rizal Reef, these two atolls are governed by the Philippines. In the meanwhile, Malaysia maintains authority over the coral reefs Swallow, Ardaiser, Erica, Mariveles, and the Investigator.

Brunei and Vietnam; Malaysia and the Philippines; and Vietnam and Malaysia have both participated in bilateral negotiations to address overlapping claims under Long Term Support (LTS). The findings of these negotiations indicate progress, even though the resolution has not yet been finalized. Brunei and the Philippines; Malaysia and Vietnam; and Vietnam and Malaysia all participated in these negotiations. China is resistant to

multilateral negotiations, including those that are facilitated by ASEAN. Instead, China prefers bilateral discussions with South China Sea claimants. These ASEAN nations are attempting to discuss overlapping claims in the South China Sea with China through the ASEAN summit.

In the meeting that took place in Phnom Penh on November 4, 2002, the governments of ASEAN countries and China gave birth to a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in The South China Sea. The essence of this agreement is that it seeks to peacefully resolve any differences and disputes between ASEAN countries and China, including the South China Sea Dispute; to produce peaceful and durable solutions, which are pursued through dialogue by affirming commitment to the goals and principles of UNCLOS,

UNCLOS, 1982 which was signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica on December 10, 1982 which was ratified by Indonesia with Law Number 17 of 1985 concerning Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. UNCLOS, 1982 regulates that; "1. The

sovereignty of a coastal State, in addition to its land area and internal waters, and in the case of an archipelagic State with its archipelagic waters, also includes a sea lane bordering it which is called the territorial sea. 2. This sovereignty includes the air space over the sea as well as the seabed and subsoil beneath." (UNCLOS, 1982. Article 2 Paragraphs 1 and 2)

UNCLOS 1982 also provides that "the continental shelf of a coastal State includes the seabed and subsoil of the subsea area lying outside its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the edge of the continental margin, or up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, in cases where the continental margin does not extend to that distance." (UNCLOS, 1982. Article 76 Paragraph 1).

It also stipulates, "The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which is subject to the special regime set forth in this Chapter under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the

rights and freedoms of other States, are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." (UNCLOS, 1982. Article 55 and Article 57).

In addition to being motivated by the theft of fish and other marine resources, the violations that took place in Indonesian jurisdictional waters were also motivated by the unresolved negotiations between Indonesia and eight of its neighboring countries regarding maritime boundaries, specifically the territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ waters. This was one of the primary motivations for the violations that took place in Indonesian jurisdictional waters.

The first step that Indonesia needs to take in order to put into action the strategy to uphold Indonesia's sovereign rights in jurisdictional waters, particularly in the EEZ in the North Natuna Sea, is to expedite negotiations with the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, and

Vietnam in order to reach an agreement on the remaining maritime boundary issues. These issues include the territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ. Indonesia also needs to reach an agreement on the remaining maritime boundary issues with Palau if Indonesia is able to successfully protect its sovereign rights in the EEZ at the North Natuna Sea, it will get assistance from the successful completion of an agreement. As a matter of fact, there are still outstanding problems that have the potential to disrupt Indonesia's sovereign rights in the the North Natuna Sea of EEZ. To be more specific, Indonesia and Malaysia have not yet concluded negotiating on the territorial sea limits and the EEZ.

The title of this research was decided upon after considering the background information presented above. The title is as follows: Indonesia's Strategies for Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Sovereignty with 1982 UNCLOS Provisions: North Natuna Sea in the framework of the Implementation of the National Defense Field. measures made by Indonesia to protect its Sovereign

Rights in Jurisdictional Waters in the North Natuna Sea, most specifically in the EEZ.

2. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

As a coastal state, Indonesia, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1982, has jurisdiction over its territorial waters extending up to a distance of 12 nautical miles measured from the baseline; its continental shelf extends up to a distance of 200 nautical miles; an additional zone extends up to a distance of 24 nautical miles; and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) rights extend out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines. Inside its territorial sea, Indonesia possesses complete authority over the natural resources found within its territorial waters.

Because it has rights to its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Indonesia has the right to explore, exploit, protect, and manage natural resources, including the generation of energy

from water, currents, and wind. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 also includes a provision stating that as, Indonesia is obligated to ensure the freedom to navigate and fly above it, and that it has the right to employ its legal rules. This section gives the impression that countries or other parties may enter and cross the area, but they are not permitted to stop and refrain from engaging in illegal operations within the EEZ. In the case of a breach, Indonesia is entitled, in accordance with the rules of national law, to exercise its right to enforce the law against the party that is responsible for the infringement.

According to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, violations against Indonesian maritime territory have been going on for a long time, at least since 2001, in the form of fish theft committed by Foreign Fishing Vessels (KIA) from the Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand,

Vietnam, and China. These violations have been reported by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP). Over the course of the past three years, a rising number of KIA and even survey ships from China have entered the North Natuna Sea illegally, accompanied by their armed coast guard ships.

Indonesia immediately protested against China's claims and registered with the United Nations on March 1, 2009 a list of geographical coordinates from the base of the Indonesian archipelago that described the Natuna waters as belonging to Indonesia's sovereign territory and stated that they are part of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In addition, in 2017 Indonesia decided to rename the portion of the South China Sea that is located inside the Natuna seas' northernmost reaches as the North Natuna Sea.

Since 2010, Indonesia has continued to carry out drilling for oil

and natural gas in the EEZ region in the North Natuna Sea which has been carried out by Pertamina, an Indonesian BUMN (State Owned Enterprise) company and by several foreign companies such as Premier Oil, KUFPEC from Kuwait, Zarubezhneft from Russia. Indonesia is also open to receiving foreign investors, including from China, to explore and exploit natural resources in all waters, including the territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ. Meanwhile, China, because it claims Indonesia's EEZ in the North Natuna Sea as its territory, has not shown any interest in investing in these waters by submitting an application to Indonesia. Instead, China continues to carry out reconnaissance under the guise of survey boats and fishing activities by so-called traditional fishermen but under the escort of the Coast Guard or its patrol boats.

There have been quite a few encounters between patrol boats

and the fully armed Chinese Coast Guard as well as Bakamla ships and the Indonesian Navy so far. These events have occurred regardless of whether either party reported them or not. Until it reached its zenith at the end of November 2021, when China protested against Indonesia over oil and natural gas drilling work in the Natuna Block, which is located in Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but which China claims as its territory. This was the moment when the tension between the two countries reached its highest point.

Following such incidents, Indonesia and China typically hold talks to defuse the situation, with both sides remaining steadfast in their respective positions; for Indonesia, the waters of the North Natuna Sea constitute its EEZ, whereas China continues to claim these waters as part of its territory on the grounds that it was historically a fishing area for its fishermen. Brunei, the Philippines,

Malaysia, and Vietnam, together with other claimants to the South China Sea, are attempting to raise this issue in multilateral meetings between ASEAN and China, but China continues to refuse to abandon its claims in the North Natuna Sae seas. Even in global forums, like South East Asean countries, China refuses to tackle this subject.

In light of the rising breaches of Indonesia's EEZ rights in the waters of the North Natuna Sea by parties from many countries, including China, and China's continued refusal to acknowledge Indonesia's EEZ rights in the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia must enhance its efforts to resolve issues.

3. METHOD

Design of The Study

A reviewing protocol was developed and followed to enact a systematic review. First, the authors used Scopus databases with keywords "Macro Theories (Grand Theory) of

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Sovereignty in North Natuna Sea” (in-between quotation marks), “Meso theories (Middle Theory) of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) related to 1982 UNCLOS Provisions:”, and “Micro Theory (Applied Theory) of North Natuna Sea issues” database was chosen since it includes for an authoritative keywords of indexed-journal sea security literature. 12 articles and 6 books were reached on November, 20, 2022. Second, the authors introduced a set of inclusion criteria to find the relevant international research among the reviewed articles reached in total. These criteria were as follows:

1. Related to North Natuna Sea cases
2. Reporting review articles, book reviews, and reports on North Natuna Sea issues
3. Peer-reviewed
4. One if occurring on both databases

After all, criteria were introduced, 12 articles and 6 books were left for the

focal review of international research published between 2012 and 2022.

3.1 RESULTS

Macro Theories (Grand Theories)

1. Theory of State Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the highest power in a country which aims to make laws and regulate the implementation and application of laws that have been made (Jimenez, 2012). Indonesia adheres to the theory of people's sovereignty, namely that the supreme power or sovereignty of the state is in the hands of the people, as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, article 1 paragraph (2); "Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and implemented according to the Constitution."

The concepts of state sovereignty and equality between nations serve as the basis for the international legal system that recognizes states as sovereign entities (Coleman & Maogoto, 2013). The elected

representatives of the people are the ones who have sovereignty over the state. The General Election is the process by which the people choose who will sit in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state government to lead the people and run the state government in accordance with the constitution as well as the laws and regulations (Herdegen, 2013), which are also made by the elected representatives of the people. These laws and regulations are also made by the elected representatives of the people.

2. Theory of the National Interest

National interest includes aspects; economy, ideology, military strength and security, morality and legality (Crawford, 2012). National interests are the goals to be achieved in relation to the needs or aspirations of the nation/state. The national interest is security, which includes the survival of the people and the existence of their

territory, as well as prosperity (Baseng, 2021).

National interest (national interest) is the main pillar of his theory of foreign policy and international politics which is a realist with the premise that diplomacy strategy must be based on national interests, not on moral, legal and ideological reasons which he considers utopian. The national interest is the minimum ability of the state to protect and maintain its physical, political and cultural identity from interference by other countries (Chapsos & Hamilton, 2019).

3. Theory of International Relations

The theory of international relations is a theory that forms the basis for efforts to study or science that studies relations between countries (Amstrong, Farrell, & Lambert, 2012). Later, it has developed that international relations are not only relations between countries, but also the involvement of non-state actors

(non-state actors) is very important, even though the realism paradigm of International Relations places the state as the sole actor or dominant actor (Clapham, 2012). The behaviorism paradigm places the state factor as the dominant element in making decisions about its international relations.

Meanwhile, the pluralism paradigm places the important role of non-state actors such as non-government organizations (NGOs) (Oegroseno, 2017). Research institutions, mass media, private companies, especially multinational corporations (MNC), which together with the state participate in determining international relations. Role Conception of the Asia-Pacific Middle Powers: Comparative Analysis of Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam.

Meso Theories (Middle Theories)

1. Theory of Threats, Challenges, Barriers and Disturbances

Threats, which include both military and non-military threats, are attempts to alter policies, which are hypothetically carried out by criminal or political activities (De Graaff & Van Gils, 2012). A military threat is the use of armed force that is deemed capable of compromising the state's integrity and sovereignty as well as the national security.

Non-military threats are those that do not involve the use of armed force but, if left uncontrolled, would imperil the state. Non-military dangers are not physical in origin and do not resemble military threats, since they take the shape of ideological, political, economic, sociocultural, information technology, and public safety components (Kaczmarek, 2021). Military and non-military threats can originate both from within a country and from abroad (external).

While challenges are efforts that aim to challenge the capabilities of a nation/country, and obstacles are efforts originating from within the country with the aim of weakening/obstructing in a non-conceptual and undirected manner. Hank Prunckun's theory is also discussed in his book; counterintelligence; Theory & Practices, argues that threats can be quantified, namely; Threat = (Desire + Expectation) + (Knowledge + Resorts).

2. Theory of Power Balance

This international relations theory is interpreted as an effort to balance strength and power to prevent one country from becoming the most powerful (dominant) over another (Holsti, 2016). In this book, one of the theory's originators, emphasized this concept. Balance of Power describes, according to Ernst Haas' writings Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda, how countries

interact and balance each other in terms of power.

3. Theory of the Sea Law

The Law of the Sea is the law that regulates the sea as an object by considering all aspects of life and the interests of all countries (Reza, Rianto, & Subianto, 2019), including countries that do not physically border the sea (Landlocked Countries), for the utilization of the sea with all the potential contained therein for mankind as stated in UNCLOS, 1982 along with directly related international conventions .

4. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Theory of Rights

In UNCLOS, 1982 Chapter V, articles 55, 56, 57 it was determined that;

“Each coastal state has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), that is, an area of water beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which is subject to the special legal regime set forth in this Chapter under which the rights and jurisdiction of the

coastal State and the rights and freedoms -liberties of other States, governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. The EEZ shall not exceed 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In the EEZ, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, both living and non-living, from the waters above the seabed and the seabed and the soil beneath it, and has other activity rights for the purposes of exploration and economic exploitation of the zone such as energy production from water, currents and wind.

Micro Theory (Applied Theories)

1. Theory of Diplomacy

The act of a government official to enter into negotiations and other relations between nations (Rijal, 2019); the art or knowledge of conducting such

negotiations (Bueger & Edmunds, 2020); the skill to organize or conduct negotiations, dealing with people, with little or no vindictive policy. Meanwhile, diplomacy is every method taken to establish and maintain relations and communicate with each other or carry out political and legal transactions which in every case are carried out through authorized representatives (Ghazi, 2015).

The Oxford English Dictionary defines diplomacy as "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of diplomats."

From the definition of experts on diplomacy, it can be understood that diplomacy is the ability to communicate and negotiate to produce as much as possible the desired goals.

2. Theory of Diplomacy Variant

Of the various variants of diplomacy, this research will use several types of diplomacy, such as total diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, defense diplomacy, and preventive diplomacy (Burnay, Joelle, & Kolja, 2014). The soft power diplomacy approach is also be used as diplomacy of a combination of soft power and hard power.

3. Theory of National Defense Capability Development

In an effort to increase its defense capability, Indonesia has implemented a policy of developing a national defense posture which is characterized by a universal people's defense and security system (Manihuruk, 2021), through increasing military and non-military defense capabilities. The development of this defense posture consistently refers to active defensive doctrine and strategies that are proactively applied in the concept of defense for large islands and strategic straits that have

effective deterrence and action power as well as formidable protracted capabilities.

The main points of military and military defense development policies include; national character building policies, posture, institutions, defense areas, defense technology and industry, as well as international cooperation (for military defense), and cooperation between ministries and agencies (for non-military defense).

4. DICUSSION

Urgent action is required to conclude maritime boundary discussions between Indonesia and the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam, as detailed above. Even though none of the remaining sea boundaries that are being negotiated or will be negotiated pertain to Indonesia's EEZ area in the North Natuna Sea, the conclusion of a comprehensive

agreement on maritime boundaries between Indonesia and its eight neighbors will significantly reduce the frequency of violations, including those in the territorial sea. Indonesian EEZ at North Natuna Sea. It will also provide Indonesia with extra soft power to persuade China to abandon its claim to Indonesia's EEZ waters in the North Natuna Sea.

Indonesia has concluded discussions on its marine limits solely with Australia and Papua New Guinea, specifically with Australia on the Continental Shelf, which was reached in 1972, and with Papua New Guinea on the Territorial Sea, which was reached in 1971, the Continental Shelf (1973.) and EEZ (1980). With the Philippines, discussions over the 2014 EEZ borders have concluded, although it is uncertain when negotiations will restart regarding the Continental Shelf. The problem of the Continental Shelf was addressed through discussions

with India in 1978, and negotiations on the EEZ are now ongoing.

With Malaysia, the Continental Shelf problem was addressed in 1969, and the Territorial Sea issue was resolved in 1970. pending negotiations When discussions will restart with Palau to settle the outstanding concerns of the Continental Shelf is unclear.

The majority of Territorial Sea concerns addressed with Singapore in 2014 have been settled, and the remaining Territorial Sea issues will be handled at a future date. With Thailand, talks on the boundaries of the Continental Shelf concluded in 1971, however the EEZ issue remains unresolved and it is unclear when negotiations will begin. Regarding the Territorial Sea, Timor-Leste and Australia have achieved an agreement, however the EEZ and Continental Shelf issues are still up in the air. Continental Shelf borderline.

In light of the fact that Indonesia has maritime border issues with eight countries that remain unresolved, Indonesia must immediately take systematic steps to approach all of these countries in order to expedite the resolution of maritime border issues pertaining to territorial sea borders, continental shelf, and EEZ. To hasten the conclusion, negotiations are proceeding with India, Malaysia, Palau, and Vietnam. To tackle the remaining concerns with the Philippines, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste, for which a date for discussions has not yet been set, it is required to quickly arrange a date and begin negotiations. This prolonged resolution of maritime borders has the potential to upset bilateral ties and cooperation between Indonesia and these nations, and it is not inconceivable that it would also threaten regional stability.

At the same time, Indonesia needs to improve its total

diplomacy approach including cultural diplomacy and defense diplomacy, directly to China to convince it that its attitude of not recognizing Indonesia's EEZ rights in the North Natuna Sea waters and claiming these waters as its territory is contrary to the provisions of UNCLOS, 1982.

China's attitude like that will disrupt relations and cooperation in all fields that have so far been well-developed between Indonesia and China. If China's attitude continues like this, it will disrupt regional stability which has been guarded and promoted by China and Indonesia, which of course is not wanted by these two friendly countries. .

The following diplomatic steps that need to be taken by Indonesia, are to approach all countries and international organizations, especially in the Asian region, both bilaterally and multilaterally and to convince them that China's stance which includes Indonesia's EEZ waters in the

North Natuna Sea as its territorial waters, is contrary to UNCLOS, 1982. Such an attitude by China will set a bad precedent and disrupt international relations and cooperation and threaten regional stability.

Indonesia's diplomatic offensive needs to be balanced with efforts to improve defense strategies, especially defense capabilities in the North Natuna Sea territorial waters to maintain the security of EEZ waters in the North Natuna Sea, and protect work activities for exploration and exploitation of natural resources, as well as conservation and research in these waters.

The maritime defense capability of the North Natuna Sea and the Riau Archipelago region, which consists of systems, personnel, defense equipment, and equipment employing advanced technologies such as telecommunication, information, communication, and cyber technology, must be enhanced in

order to combat potential threats and disturbances in these waters. In addition to supporting natural resource management, oversight, and law enforcement, the the North Natuna Sea of ZEE region is monitored for breaches of the freedom of navigation and flight. In the event that Indonesia's sovereign rights in the EEZ region at the North Natuna Sea are jeopardized, the threat will expand to Indonesia's national interests.

According to the provisions of UNCLOS, 1982, Indonesia has a territorial sea that is 12 nautical miles wide from the base line of its outermost islands, a continental shelf that includes the seabed and the land beneath it with a width of 200 miles from the base line, an additional zone that borders its territorial sea up to 24 nautical miles from the baselines, and an EEZ, which is an area outside and adjacent to the territorial sea whose width is 200 miles.

Regarding the rights and obligations of a country that owns

an EEZ, it is regulated in article 56, UNCLOS, 1982, namely;

"Within the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has;

1. Sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, both living and non-living, from the waters above the seabed and from the seabed and subsoil and related to other activities for the purposes of economic exploration and exploitation the zone, such as energy production from water, currents and wind.
2. Jurisdiction as defined in the relevant provisions of this Convention with respect to:
 - a) manufacture and use of artificial islands, installations and buildings; (ii) marine scientific research;

b) protection and preservation of the sea;"

In the EEZ waters of the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia or other parties need to conduct all activities related to natural resource management, economic exploration and exploitation, the construction and use of artificial islands, installations, and buildings, marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine environment through a diplomatic strategy consisting of two simultaneous steps, the first of which involves efforts to expedite the implementation of negotiations and the conclusion of a territorial boundary agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam sea. On the other hand, Indonesia is required to guarantee freedom of navigation across the sea in the EEZ's waters and air passage in the airspace above it, so long as it does not transport illegal passengers or goods.

Indonesia is authorized to enforce its national laws in the event of a violation through a defense diplomacy approach to China, by leveraging Indonesia-China bilateral defense cooperation and multilateral defense cooperation venues such as ARF and ADMM Plus where China is a discussion partner.

5. CONCLUSION

Indonesia needs expedite negotiations with the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam in order to reach an agreement on the remaining maritime boundary issues, including the territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ. This is the first step in implementing the strategy to uphold Indonesia's sovereign rights in jurisdictional waters, especially in the EEZ in the North Natuna Sea. The achievement of an agreement will aid Indonesia's attempts to protect its sovereign rights in the North Natuna Sea EEZ. Because there

are still outstanding concerns that might jeopardize Indonesia's sovereign rights in the EEZ of the North Natuna Sea, notably that Indonesia and Malaysia have not yet concluded negotiations on the territorial sea boundaries and EEZ.

In particular, Indonesia needs to anticipate and overcome the problems caused by the withdrawal of NDL by China with its claim on Indonesia's EEZ in the North Natuna Sea. As a coastal country, Indonesia "has sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, both living and non-living, from the waters above the seabed and from the seabed and subsoil and with respect to other activities such as the production of energy from water, currents and wind." (UNCLOS, 1982 art. 56).

In order to uphold Indonesia's sovereign rights in the waters of the ZEE in the North Natuna Sea, it is necessary to employ two strategies that are simultaneously

implemented and mutually supportive. The first is a diplomatic strategy that consists of two simultaneous steps, the first of which is an effort to expedite the implementation of negotiations and the conclusion of a territorial boundary agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. sea. China must be persuaded to withdraw its claim over Indonesia's EEZ waters in the North Natuna Sea.

The first strategy is a defense strategy consisting of three steps that are carried out simultaneously and mutually supportive, the first

step is a defense diplomacy approach by making optimal use of bilateral defense cooperation forums between Indonesia and friendly countries, and ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation forums, such as; ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), ADMM (ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting), and ADMM Plus.

The second step is a defense diplomacy approach to China, by utilizing Indonesia-China bilateral defense cooperation and multilateral defense cooperation forums such as ARF and ADMM Plus where China is a dialogue partner.

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